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Aesthetic Adjectives: Experimental Semantics  
and Context-Sensitivity* 
 
Shen-yi Liao & Aaron Meskin 
  
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)† 
 
 
 
One aim of this paper is to make a contribution to understanding aesthetic 
communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and 
transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others. Our focus will be on the use 
of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication. Although theorists working on 
the semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable 
adjectives, they have tended to avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of 
adjectives that play a central role in expressing aesthetic evaluations (e.g., 
‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘elegant’). And despite the wealth of attention paid to aesthetic 
adjectives by philosophical aestheticians, they have paid little attention to 
contemporary semantic theories of adjectives. We take our work to be a first step 
in remedying these lacunae. In this paper, we present four experiments that 
examine one aspect of how aesthetic adjectives ordinarily function: the context-
sensitivity of their application standards. Our results present a prima facie 
empirical challenge to a common distinction between relative and absolute 
gradable adjectives because aesthetic adjectives are found to behave differently 
from both. Our results thus also constitute a prima facie vindication of some 
philosophical aestheticians’ contention that aesthetic adjectives constitute a 
particularly interesting segment of natural language, even if the boundaries of this 
segment turns out to be different from what they had in mind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philosophical aestheticians are interested in a wide range of things having to do 
with the aesthetic domain, such as the production of art, the reception of art, our 
aesthetic responses to nature, and the nature of art itself. But communication is 
another key aspect of our aesthetic lives with which aestheticians have been and 
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should be concerned. After all, we don’t just produce and consume art—we 
spend a significant amount of time talking, writing and reading about it. One 
aim of this essay is to make a contribution to understanding aesthetic 
communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and 
transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others.1 Our focus will be on the 
use of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication, and in focusing on such 
adjectives we follow in a long line of contemporary aestheticians who have been 
inspired by Frank Sibley’s (1959, 1965) seminal work on aesthetic concepts. 
So how do aesthetic adjectives work? Although theorists working on the 
semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable 
adjectives generally and have explored the closely related class of adjectives 
known as predicates of personal taste (e.g., ‘tasty’, ‘fun’), they have tended to 
avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of adjectives that play a central role 
in expressing aesthetic evaluations (e.g., ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘elegant’). And despite 
the wealth of attention paid to aesthetic adjectives by philosophical aestheticians, 
they have paid little attention to contemporary semantic theories of adjectives. 
We take our work to be a first step in remedying these lacunae.  
 In this paper, we present four experiments that examine one aspect of 
how aesthetic adjectives ordinarily function: the context-sensitivity of their 
application standards. Our results present a prima facie empirical challenge to a 
common distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives because 
aesthetic adjectives are found to behave differently from paradigmatic relative 
and absolute gradable adjectives. Our results thus also constitute a prima facie 
vindication of some philosophical aestheticians’ (e.g., Sibley 1959, 2001a, 2001b) 
contention that aesthetic adjectives constitute a particularly interesting segment 
of natural language, even if the boundaries of this segment turns out to be 
different from what they had in mind. 
Section 1 briefly presents the philosophical and psycholinguistic 
background for our experiments. Sections 2-5 report the methods and results of 
our four experiments. Section 6 presents a dilemma for the distinction between 
relative and absolute gradable adjectives and discusses ways that one might 
escape the dilemma. Section 7 discusses further implication of our results—in 
relation to predicates of personal taste, experimental philosophy, and aesthetic 
communication—and outlines avenues for future research. 
 
1. Classifying Gradable Adjectives 
 
1.1. Relative vs. Absolute 
 
The majority, if not all, of evaluative aesthetic terms (e.g., ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’) are 
gradable adjectives. Like other gradable adjectives, they admit of comparative 
constructions, such as ‘Barbara Hepworth’s sculptures are more beautiful than 
Henry Moore’s’.  
One common classification scheme of gradable adjectives concerns their 
context-sensitivity. Some gradable adjectives, such as ‘long’ and ‘tall’, are 
                                                      
1 So our conception of aesthetic communication is quite distinct from that of Gary Iseminger (2004: 25) who 
understands ‘aesthetic communication’ to refer to the process by which an agent designs and produces an 
artifact with the aim and result that it is appreciated by some other agent. 
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typically interpreted relative to a contextually-determined comparison class. 
Other gradable adjectives, such as ‘spotted’ and ‘flat’, typically are not. Following 
linguists Christopher Kennedy and Louise McNally (2005), we will call the 
former kind relative gradable adjectives (or ‘relative’ for short) and the latter kind 
absolute gradable adjectives (or ‘absolute’ for short). And we will call the 
classification scheme the relative/absolute classification scheme of gradable 
adjectives. 
Absolute adjectives come in two varieties—minimal standard adjectives 
(e.g., ‘damp’, ‘bent’), which require some minimal degree of the relevant 
property, and maximal standard adjectives (e.g., ‘full’, ‘closed’), which require a 
maximal degree of the relevant property. Although such adjectives may be used 
imprecisely in certain contexts (e.g., one might call a shopping bag full even if 
there is a little room left in it), they do not admit of context-dependent 
interpretations.2 
 
1.2. Non-Experimental Evidence 
 
One piece of semantic data for the relative/absolute classification scheme of 
gradable adjectives concerns the different patterns of entailment that relative and 
absolute adjectives generate.3 Consider first an example with a relative adjective. 
The statement ‘John is taller than Jim’ entails neither ‘John is tall’ nor ‘Jim is not 
tall’. Consider second an example with a maximal standard adjective. The 
statement ‘his fence is straighter than your fence’ seems to entail ‘your fence is 
not straight’. Similarly, consider a minimal standard absolute adjective. The 
statement ‘her fence is more bent than our fence’ seems to entail ‘her fence is 
bent’. Typically, comparative statements involving absolute adjectives generate 
such entailments, but comparative statements involving relative adjectives do not 
(Kennedy 2007). 
At first glance, many positive aesthetic adjectives appear to be best 
classified as relative adjectives. ‘John is more beautiful than Jim’ entails neither 
‘Jim is not beautiful’ nor ‘John is beautiful’. ‘Jane is prettier than Jan’ entails 
neither ‘Jane is pretty’ nor ‘Jan is not pretty.’4 However, discussions of aesthetic 
adjectives are largely absent from the inquiry into the nature of gradable 
adjectives. We will argue that overlooking aesthetic adjectives is a mistake 
because aesthetic adjectives turn out to present puzzling data that complicate the 
relative/absolute classification scheme of gradable adjectives. 
 
1.3. Experimental Evidence 
 
Building on the relative/absolute classification scheme, linguist Kristen Syrett 
and colleagues have developed an experimental paradigm, the presupposition 
assessment task (PAT), for classifying gradable adjectives as either relative or 
                                                      
2 See Kennedy (2007: 23-25) for discussion of imprecision. 
3 Toledo and Sassoon (2011) and Liao, McNally, and Meskin (forthcoming) survey other semantic diagnostics 
in support of, and against, the relative/absolute classification of gradable adjectives. 
4 Bierwisch (1989: 206-207) claims that it follow from ‘Eva is prettier than Helga’ that both Eva and Helga are 
pretty. If so, ‘pretty’ may be a minimal standard absolute adjective. We are unconvinced: ‘Eva is not pretty but 
she is prettier than Helga’ sounds fine to us. The equivocal nature of these semantic intuitions may play a role 
in explaining the results of our study. 
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absolute depending on their patterns of use by competent speakers (Syrett et al. 
2006, 2010). In the main studies, they presented children and adults with pairs of 
objects with different degrees of the relevant property. They then asked them to 
pick out the long one, the spotted one, and so on. According to them, the use of 
the definite article ‘the’ in such requests involves two presuppositions: EXISTENCE 
(that there is at least one object satisfying the adjective) and UNIQUENESS (that 
there is at most one object satisfying the adjective). 
On a standard view, a key feature of relative adjectives is that they have 
standards of comparison that vary by context. For example, the cut-off point for 
counting an object as being long varies according to the salient objects of 
comparison in a given context. Hence, when relative adjectives are used in the 
request, people are typically able to construct a comparison class “on the fly”—
namely, by shifting the standard of comparison—so that both EXISTENCE and 
UNIQUENESS are satisfied. Experimentally, Syrett and colleagues found that both 
children and adults did typically comply with the request in the PAT when it 
came to paradigmatic relative adjectives, such as ‘big’ and ‘long’. For example, 
when presented with two rods of different lengths, both children and adults 
typically picked out the longer rod as the long one. Participant compliance 
indicates that they are able to construct a comparison class so that both 
EXISTENCE and UNIQUENESS are satisfied, which indicates that the adjective in 
question is best classified as relative. 
In contrast with relative adjectives, absolute adjectives have context-
independent standards of comparison. Hence, requests involving absolute 
adjectives will not always allow for the construction of a comparison class so that 
both EXISTENCE and UNIQUENESS are satisfied. For example, regardless of 
context, an object counts as being bent if it is bent to a non-zero degree. Faced 
with two rods bent to different (non-zero) degrees, people are not typically able 
to construct a comparison class “on the fly” in which one counts as bent and the 
other does not. So in that case UNIQUENESS cannot be satisfied. Experimentally, 
Syrett and colleagues found that adults (and children, with some exceptions 
described below) did typically refuse the request in the PAT when it came to 
paradigmatic absolute adjectives, such as ‘spotted’, ‘full’, ‘bumpy’ and ‘straight’. 
For example, when presented with two discs which are both spotted to different 
degrees, both children and adults typically refuse to pick out the spotted one 
since UNIQUENESS is violated. Most adults also refuse when asked to pick out the 
full one between two jars neither of which are full but are full to different 
degrees. Again, this is due to the violation of UNIQUENESS. And although 
children exhibit a different pattern of behavior with ‘full’ and ‘straight’ (they are 
significantly more willing than adults to choose the more full one in response to 
the request for the ‘full’ one and the straighter one in response to the request for 
the ‘straight’ one), Syrett and her colleagues argue, on the basis of reaction time 
studies, that they still exhibit a marked difference in their treatment of relative 
and absolute adjectives. For example, even when they picked out the more full 
jar as the full one, children typically took much longer to do so. Participant 
refusal, or a notable increase in reaction time, indicates that the adjective in 
question does not have a context-dependent standard of comparison, and is thus 
best classified as absolute. 
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2. Study 1: ‘Beautiful’ 
 
2.1. Motivation and Methods 
 
We implemented the PAT as an online questionnaire. Participants were given 
instructions of the task alongside an instructional manipulation check that 
ensures participants read the instructions carefully (cf. Oppenheimer et al. 2009). 
Each adjective / stimuli set was then presented in the following format (fig. 1): 
 
(ADJECTIVE) 
 
Figure 1: adjective / stimuli set presentation format for Study 1 & Study 2 
 
Participants were then asked to choose one response from the following options 
for each adjective / stimuli set (the order of the options remained constant): 
 
¥ Object A is the (ADJECTIVE) object. 
¥ Object B is the (ADJECTIVE) object. 
¥ I can’t. Neither Object A nor Object B is (ADJECTIVE). 
¥ I can’t. Both Object A and Object B are (ADJECTIVE). 
 
For this study, we simply counted the first and second responses as 
compliance responses, and the third and fourth responses as refusal responses. 
All participants went through 8 adjective / stimuli sets (the order of presentation 
was counterbalanced): disks that are spotted to different degrees, rods that are 
bent to different degrees, blocks that are long to different degrees, and male faces 
that are beautiful to different degrees.5 
For each adjective tested, there were two comparison sets of stimuli, 
which were constructed using a combination of existing photographs and digital 
manipulation. For example, for the ‘beautiful’ stimuli, we modified a photograph 
of a man’s face to produce three versions with increasing feature asymmetry. 
One comparison set consisted of the least asymmetric one and the intermediate 
one. Another comparison set consisted of the intermediate one and the most 
asymmetric one. 
                                                      
5 Full material and data for all studies reported in this paper are deposited in the Open Science Framework 
repository and openly available for access at https://osf.io/6uztd/. The rod and block images are drawn from 
Syrett and colleagues’ stimuli (cf. Syrett 2007). The unmanipulated face images are drawn from an emotion 
expression database, and chosen for their emotion neutrality. 
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We recruited 40 participants (19 women; Mage = 34.03; SDage = 14.27) for 
this study from Amazon Mechanical Turk, restricting the eligibility to people 
whose registered location is in the United States and have HIT approval rate 
greater than or equal to 95%.6 
 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 
We replicated Syrett and colleagues’ results with non-aesthetic gradable 
adjectives. 97.4% of participants complied with the request to pick out the long 
object. In contrast, only 17.9% of participants complied with the request to pick 
out the straight object (where EXISTENCE is violated) and only 10.3% of 
participants complied with the request to pick out the spotted object (where 
UNIQUENESS is violated). We did not find any gender or order effects, and so 
these variables are not investigated further. 
We found that 43.6% of participants complied with the request to pick 
out the beautiful object amongst two male faces. When we compared patterns of 
compliance and refusal between the adjectives tested (fig. 2), it turns out that 
‘beautiful’ functioned very differently from the relative adjective ‘long’ (X2(1) = 
54.384, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.590), and also from the absolute adjectives 
‘straight’ (X2(1) = 7.510, p = 0.006, Cramer’s V = 0.253) and ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 
13.173, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.336). If ‘beautiful’ is typical of aesthetic 
adjectives, then the results from Study 1 suggest that aesthetic adjectives do not 
function like either paradigmatic relative adjectives or paradigmatic absolute 
adjectives. 
 
 
Figure 2: ‘beautiful’ vs. paradigmatic relative and absolute adjectives 
 
                                                      
6 See Paolacci and Chandler (2014) for an overview of the demographic characteristics of the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk participant pool, its validity for conducting social scientific research, and data quality 
comparisons with traditional university lab studies. 
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3. Study 2: ‘Ugly’ 
 
3.1. Motivation and Methods 
 
Although Study 1 is suggestive, it does not clearly establish the general 
conclusion that aesthetic adjectives function differently from both relative and 
absolute adjectives. One might wonder whether the results of Study 1 merely 
reflect experimental artifacts rather than a genuine pattern of language usage. 
Specifically, first, one might wonder whether the same result holds of other 
aesthetic adjectives, and, second, one might wonder whether the same result 
holds of different kinds of stimuli. 
We wanted to address these doubts in Study 2. We tested the negatively-
valenced aesthetic adjective ‘ugly’, in part because some semantic diagnostics 
suggest that it—unlike ‘beautiful’—may be better classified as absolute rather 
than relative.7 We also used a range of stimuli from different domains: people 
(digitally manipulated photographs of a female face with different levels of 
asymmetry), artifacts (photographs of sports cars in different stages of 
restoration), and natural objects (photographs of sunflowers in different stages 
of decay). As before, we followed Syrett and colleagues in using ‘long’ as our 
paradigmatic relative adjective and ‘spotted’ as our paradigmatic absolute 
adjective. 
The adjective / stimuli sets were presented in the same format as before 
(fig. 1). However, for this study, we conducted a further analysis that made use of 
another phase of the experiment. As was the case in Study 1, there was a phase of 
the experiment—call it the selective phase—where participants were asked to 
make a selective judgment about the stimuli with respect to the salient adjective. 
In the selective phase, we asked participants to choose one response from the 
following options for each adjective / stimuli set: 
 
¥ Object A is the (ADJECTIVE) object. 
¥ Object B is the (ADJECTIVE) object. 
¥ I can’t. Neither Object A nor Object B is (ADJECTIVE). 
¥ I can’t. Both Object A and Object B are (ADJECTIVE). 
 
After the selective phase, participants entered another phase of the 
experiment—call it the comparative phase—where they were asked to make a 
comparative judgment about the stimuli with respect to the salient adjective. In 
the comparative phase, we asked participants to choose one response from the 
following options for each adjective / stimuli set: 
 
¥ Object A is more (ADJECTIVE) than Object B. 
¥ Object B is more (ADJECTIVE) than Object A. 
¥ Neither object is (ADJECTIVE). 
¥ Both objects are equally (ADJECTIVE). 
 
                                                      
7 What sort of gradable adjective is ‘ugly’? ‘John is uglier than Jim’ does not seem to entail ‘Jim is not ugly’. So 
‘ugly’ does not seem to be a maximal standard absolute adjective. But Morzycki (2012: 578) suggests that ‘ugly’ 
has a scale closed at the lower end. If so, it is a minimal standard absolute adjective. 
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Within each phase, the order of presentation of the adjective / stimuli sets was 
randomized and the order of response options remained constant. 
 Results from the comparative phase can provide insights into the 
reasons for participants’ responses in the selective phase.8 Some participants 
refused to judge one object as more beautiful or ugly than the other. Call such 
responses neither-greater responses. If a participant’s refusal response in the 
selective phase is linked to a neither-greater response in the comparative phase, 
then the former response would not constitute evidence for her treating an 
adjective as an absolute adjective. Hence, to ensure that participant response 
patterns gathered from the selective phase are truly indicative of their treatment 
of a gradable adjective as relative or absolute, in subsequent analyses we filtered 
out the refusal responses in the selective phase that merely stem from neither-
greater responses in the comparative phase. 
We recruited 40 participants (11 women; Mage = 26.85; SDage = 7.49) for 
this study from Amazon Mechanical Turk, again restricting the eligibility to 
people whose registered location is in the United States and have HIT approval 
rate greater than or equal to 95%.  
 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
 
Although semantic tests indicate that the aesthetic adjective ‘ugly’ is classifiable 
as a gradable adjective, a decent proportion of participants in Study 2 (37.1% for 
people; 12.8% for artifacts; 23.1% for natural objects) were unwilling to judge 
one object as uglier than another (fig. 3). In contrast, virtually all participants 
were willing to judge that one object possessed the relevant property to a greater 
degree in the case of the paradigmatic relative and absolute adjectives. In other 
words, there is a relative prevalence of neither-greater responses with ‘ugly’. We 
think this phenomenon calls for an explanation in its own right, but we have no 
settled view yet. 
 
                                                      
8 Results from the comparative phase also allowed us to exclude obvious nonsense responses, such as picking 
Object A to be the ugly one but judging that Object B is uglier than Object A. On this basis, 5 responses were 
excluded from ‘ugly’ (face), 1 response was excluded from ‘ugly’ (car), 1 response was excluded from ‘ugly’ 
(flower), and 2 responses were excluded from ‘long’. This exclusion criterion was determined and implemented 
prior to any substantial analysis of the data. 
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Figure 3: ‘ugly’ vs. paradigmatic relative and absolute 
 adjectives (refusal / compliance / neither-greater) 
 
We then filtered out neither-greater responses from subsequent analyses 
so that we can determine whether the aesthetic adjective ‘ugly’ is relative or 
absolute. When we compared patterns of compliance and refusal between the 
adjectives tested, we observed the same kind of results that we found in Study 1 
(fig. 4). With people as stimuli, ‘ugly’ functioned differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s 
exact (2-sided)9, p = 0.029, Cramer’s V = 0.309) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 
24.742, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.637). With artifacts as stimuli, ‘ugly’ 
functioned differently from ‘long’ (X2(1) = 6.853, p = 0.009, Cramer’s V = 0.309) 
and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 28.474, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.625). With natural 
objects as stimuli, ‘ugly’ functioned differently from ‘long’ (X2(1) = 19.208, p < 
0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.531) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 12.093, p = 0.001, 
Cramer’s V = 0.419). Collectively, the results of Study 2 again indicate that 
aesthetic adjectives do not function like either paradigmatic relative adjectives or 
paradigmatic absolute adjectives. 
 
                                                      
9 Fisher’s exact test is used wherever the minimum-expected-cell-count assumption of Pearson’s chi-square test 
is violated. There is no clear consensus on the best way to report effect size for Fisher’s exact test, but Cramer’s 
V is somewhat accepted, and we report it for ease of comparison with other results. 
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Figure 4: ‘ugly’ vs. paradigmatic relative and absolute adjectives (refusal / 
compliance) 
 
4. Study 3: Abstract Sculptures 
 
4.1. Motivation and Methods 
 
Although we believe that Study 1 and Study 2 together give fairly strong evidence 
that aesthetic adjectives complicate the relative/absolute classification scheme of 
gradable adjectives, further questions arose when we presented the earlier 
experiments. We group the questions into two kinds. 
  
Theoretical: 
¥ One of our investigative goals is to increase philosophical 
aestheticians’ understanding of the language of aesthetics. In the 
philosophical aesthetics literature, discussions of aesthetic terms 
have often focused on their use in artistic contexts (Sibley 1959; 
Walton 1970; Kivy 1973). However, Study 1 and Study 2 only test 
for the use of aesthetic adjectives with mundane objects, such as 
people and artifacts. So, do ordinary people apply aesthetic 
adjectives to artworks in the same way that they apply aesthetic 
adjectives to mundane objects? 
¥ One limitation with generalizing from ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ is that 
they are typically thought to standardly express purely evaluative 
concepts. There is a traditional—but controversial—distinction 
made in normative philosophy between thin evaluative concepts, 
which are purely evaluative, and thick evaluative concepts, which 
are partly evaluative and partly descriptive (Williams 1985). 
Although aestheticians have not typically made this distinction 
using this vocabulary, they have often made similar distinctions 
11 
 
between ‘intrinsically or solely evaluative terms’ and ‘evaluation-
added terms’ (Sibley 1974), or ‘verdictive judgments’ and 
‘substantive judgments’ (Zangwill 1995). While ‘beautiful’ and 
‘ugly’—at least on one disambiguation of those terms—are 
commonly thought to fall into the former (thin / verdictive) 
category, other adjectives such as ‘elegant’ and ‘graceful’ are thought 
to fall into the latter (thick / substantive) category. One potential 
difference is that thin evaluative adjectives are plausibly more 
multidimensional—they can be evaluated with respect to a greater 
variety of criteria, given their lack of descriptive component—than 
thick evaluative adjectives. So, do people use thin and thick 
aesthetic adjectives differently? 
 
Methodological: 
¥ In Study 1 and Study 2, participants always responded to the tasks 
by choosing one from a list of options. Although we consistently 
replicated Syrett and colleagues’ pattern of results with non-
aesthetic gradable adjectives, our experimental paradigm can 
nevertheless seem comparatively less natural and less behavioral. 
Could some artifact remain in our experimental paradigm? 
¥ Some of our stimuli sets, including the human face sets, consist of 
various digital manipulations of one original photograph. Could 
participant responses be an artifact of our method of stimuli 
construction? Perhaps some participants refused to make selective 
or comparative judgments when they deemed two stimuli as too 
similar or indistinguishable. Or perhaps some participants refused 
to make selective or comparative judgments when they saw two 
stimuli as depicting one and the same object. (Compare: the request 
to identify “the tall one” may seem odd if one is presented with two 
photographs of one and the same child before and after a growth 
spurt.) 
  
We sought to answer all these questions in Study 3. In response to one of 
the methodological questions, this study adopted a revised experimental 
paradigm. Each adjective / stimuli set is now presented in the following form: 
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[Selective Phase] Please pick out the (ADJECTIVE) one. 
 
[Comparative Phase] Please pick out the one that is (MORE 
ADJECTIVE) 
 
Figure 5: adjective / stimuli set presentation format  
for Study 3 & Study 4 (selective phase only) 
 
Participants were instructed to pick out an object by directly clicking on the 
picture of it, before advancing to the next set. This direct clicking procedure 
more closely mirrors that of the procedure used in Syrett’s original design in 
giving the participants a sense of immediacy. The new experimental design is 
more natural than the old one because participants can now refuse to perform 
the task and then give their own reasons.10 Participants again went through the 
selective phase and then the comparative phase, and the order of presentation of 
the adjective / stimuli sets was randomized within each phase. 
 We also modified the experimental design in response to the other 
questions. The aesthetic stimuli for this study consisted of photographs of 
abstract sculptures by Barbara Hepworth, Henry Moore, Constantin Brancusi, 
and Isamu Noguchi.11 We chose abstract sculptures to avoid any 
depiction/depicta confusion; we wanted to make clear to the participants that 
they have to apply the aesthetic adjectives to the artwork—the sculpture, in this 
case—and not what the artwork represents. We tested the thin aesthetic adjective 
‘beautiful’ with the Hepworth and Moore sculptures, and the thick aesthetic 
adjective ‘elegant’ with the Brancusi and Noguchi sculptures. In response to 
                                                      
10 Unfortunately, this revised experimental paradigm also introduces a potential demand characteristic: to fulfill 
the good participant role, participants may be less inclined to refuse to select an object because that would 
amount to refusing to complete the purported task. To mitigate this demand characteristic, we used the initial 
instruction set to hint that refusing to select an object is a perfectly acceptable response. In the instructional set 
for the selective phase, participants were shown two rods that are bent to different degrees and the adjective 
‘straight’. Participants were then asked to refuse to pick out the object that is straight and type in the 
explanation field ‘because both rods are bent’. 
11 The specific works presented were: Hepworth, Oval Sculpture No. 2 (1943/1958); Hepworth, Image II (1960); 
Moore, Composition (1932); Moore, Three Points (1939); Brancusi, Endless Column (1918); Brancusi, The Bird 
(1923/1947); Noguchi, Red Cube (1968); Noguchi, Skyviewing Sculpture (1969). 
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another one of the methodological questions, all the sculptures look sufficiently 
distinct from others. 
We recruited 40 participants for this study from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, again restricting the eligibility to people whose registered location is in the 
United States and have HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 95%. Prior to 
any data analysis, we excluded 5 participants for giving at least one obvious-
nonsense response.12 The sample that remains, which was used for subsequent 
data analyses, consisted of responses from 35 participants (19 women; Mage = 
31.63; SDage = 9.09). 
 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
 
Again, results from the comparative phase showed a relative prevalence of 
neither-greater responses with aesthetic adjectives. A decent proportion of 
participants in Study 3 were unwilling to judge that one object possessed the 
relevant property to a greater degree with respect to the aesthetic adjectives (fig. 
6). We found this tendency with both the thin aesthetic adjective ‘beautiful’ and 
with the thick aesthetic adjective ‘elegant’. Again, we believe that this 
phenomenon calls for explanation in its own right. 
 
 
Figure 6: thin and thick aesthetic adjectives vs. paradigmatic  
relative and absolute adjectives (refusal / compliance / neither-greater) 
 
We then filtered out neither-greater responses from subsequent data 
analyses. When we compared patterns of compliance and refusal between the 
                                                      
12 Footnote 8 explains what counts as an obvious-nonsense response. Study 3 adopts a revised different 
exclusion criterion from Study 2: we now exclude participants rather than individual responses. We have a two-
fold rationale. First, we were concerned that excluding just the nonsense responses resulted in response sets 
that were not the same size for all adjectives tested. Second, we had reservations about the trustworthiness of a 
participant who gives a nonsense response with at least one adjective / stimuli set. This revision in exclusion 
criterion was decided prior to conducting Study 3. 
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adjectives tested, once again we observed the same kind of results that we found 
in Study 1 and Study 2 (fig. 7). To start, consider the putatively thin or verdictive 
aesthetic adjective ‘beautiful’. With Hepworth sculptures as stimuli, ‘beautiful’ 
functioned differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 0.014, Cramer’s V 
= 0.328) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 33.899, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.739). With 
Moore sculptures as stimuli, ‘beautiful’ functioned differently from ‘long’ 
(Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 0.002, Cramer’s V = 0.406) and from ‘spotted’ 
(X2(1) = 27.279, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.669). Then, consider the putatively 
thick or substantive aesthetic adjective ‘elegant’. With Brancusi sculptures as 
stimuli, ‘elegant’ functioned differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 
0.003, Cramer’s V = 0.366) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 31.420, p < 0.001, 
Cramer’s V = 0.695). With Noguchi sculptures as stimuli, ‘elegant’ functioned 
differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 0.002, Cramer’s V = 0.418) 
and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 26.139, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.661).  
 
 
Figure 7: thin and thick aesthetic adjectives vs. paradigmatic  
 relative and absolute adjectives (refusal / compliance) 
 
In addition to once again demonstrating that aesthetic adjectives do not 
function like either paradigmatic relative adjectives or paradigmatic absolute 
adjectives, results from Study 3 bring out other aspects of how aesthetic 
adjectives functions that hold theoretical interest. First, since the results with 
‘beautiful’ are in line with the results with ‘elegant’, putatively thin and thick 
aesthetic adjectives appear to function in more or less the same way. Second, 
since the results from this study are broadly in line with results from earlier 
studies, aesthetic adjectives appear to function in more or less the same way with 
both mundane and artistic objects. We therefore have accumulated further 
reasons to think that aesthetic adjectives robustly problematize the 
relative/absolute classification scheme of gradable adjectives. 
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5. Study 4: Two Alternate Hypotheses 
 
5.1. Motivation and Methods 
 
We believe that Studies 1-3 provide strong support for our contention that 
aesthetic adjectives complicate the relative/absolute classification scheme of 
gradable adjectives. When we have presented the results of Studies 1-3, a 
common response is to point to folk relativism about aesthetics as a factor that 
can help to explain the results. However, it is difficult to pin down a precise 
hypothesis. 
 So, in Study 4, we used one simple operationalization to investigate this 
idea. In the final demographic phase, after all the other tasks are finished, 
participants were asked “It is commonly said: ‘There is no disputing taste’. Do you 
agree or disagree?” and responded on a 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree) 
scale. However, we found no evidence for this factor making any difference in 
any direction. Participants who refused on the selection tasks with aesthetic 
adjectives are no more or less likely than participants who complied to be folk 
relativists about aesthetics, on this measure. 
 However, in addition, the other aspects of Study 4 investigate more 
subtle variations on the idea behind the common response. Specifically, two 
alternative hypotheses have been suggested to us, both of which appeal more 
indirectly to interpersonal variations in aesthetics.  
 
Hypothesis 1: No Crisp Judgments 
 According to Kennedy (2011), there is a phenomenon that is distinctive 
of relative, but not absolute, adjectives: if two objects A and B are judged to be 
very similar with respect to the relevant property (e.g., very close in size, very 
close in age), and the relevant adjective is relative, then implicit comparisons 
such as ‘A is the big one’ and ‘B is the old one’ will be judged to be infelicitous 
even when explicit comparison such as ‘A is bigger than B’ are fine. So, for 
example, it is allegedly infelicitous to call one of a pair of children ‘the old one’ if 
their birthdays differ by only one or two days. Call this phenomenon no crisp 
judgments. 
No crisp judgments could explain the pattern of responses we observed 
with aesthetic adjectives as follows. It is plausible that there is a significant degree 
of interpersonal variation in aesthetic attribution. If some subjects judge a pairs 
of stimuli to be quite similar aesthetically, they may be unwilling to judge either 
one of the stimuli as ‘the beautiful one’, ‘the ugly one’, or ‘the elegant one’ 
because of the no crisp judgment phenomenon. But other subjects who judge the 
pairs to be substantially different aesthetically will have no trouble making such 
judgments. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Absolute with Varying Thresholds 
 Although we started this investigation thinking that aesthetic adjectives 
are likely to be relative, based on the semantic tests that Kennedy presented, 
philosopher Mark Phelan raised a radical alternative in his comments on our 
paper at the 2014 Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology. According to 
Phelan, aesthetic adjectives such as ‘elegant’ and ‘beautiful’ are absolute 
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adjectives with minimum thresholds that vary interpersonally.13 On Phelan’s 
hypothesis, what happens is that some participants comply with the selection 
task because only one object meets the minimum threshold of, say, beauty, and 
other participants refuse because both objects meet the minimum threshold of, 
say, beauty.  
As an analogy, consider how people would respond to the selection task 
with the minimum standard absolute adjective ‘spotted’ when presented with 
discs of one and five spots respectively. Presumably “one spotters” (i.e., those for 
whom the minimum threshold for counting something as spotted is one) would 
refuse to pick out ‘the spotted object’ because they would count both discs as 
spotted, while “two spotters” would comply because they would count only one 
of the discs as spotted.  
 
We sought to address these two alternative hypotheses in Study 4. We used the 
same set of stimuli as the one in Study 3. The selection phase of this study is the 
same as the one in Study 3 (fig. 5). However, we modified the comparative phase 
of this study. Instead of asking participants to explicitly compare two objects, we 
followed one of Phelan’s suggestions and asked participants to rate the two 
objects individually, each on a sliding scale (an example in fig. 8). 
 
BEAUTIFUL 
 
Figure 8: an example of the adjective / stimuli set  
presentation format for Study 4 (comparative phase only) 
 
                                                      
13 Phelan presented a pilot study, omitted here due to space considerations, that provided some initial support 
for this hypothesis. We have deposited Phelan’s pilot study in the data and material repository associated with 
our paper, accessible at https://osf.io/6uztd/. We thank him for his permission to share it. 
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 Using a fine-grain measure in the comparative phase allows us to assess 
both of the hypotheses mentioned earlier. Regarding Hypothesis 1, we can check 
whether instances of refusal in the selection phase are accompanied by very small 
differences in the degree ratings of the respective two objects. Regarding 
Hypothesis 2, we can check whether some participants are complying with the 
request to choose the beautiful one simply because only one of the two objects 
meets the minimum threshold for beauty. 
We recruited 50 participants for this study from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, restricting the eligibility to people whose registered location is in the 
United States and have HIT approval rate greater than or equal to 97%. Prior to 
any data analysis, 8 participants were excluded for failing a comprehension test 
or for giving one obvious nonsense response. The sample that remains, which 
was used for subsequent data analyses, consisted of responses from 42 
participants (20 women; Mage = 39.62; SDage = 13.85). 
  
5.2. Results and Discussion 
 
As before, we filtered out neither-greater responses from subsequent data 
analyses so that we can again test to see whether the aesthetic adjectives 
‘beautiful’ and ‘elegant’ are relative or absolute. When we compared patterns of 
just compliance and refusal between the adjectives tested, once again we 
observed the same kind of results that we found in Studies 1-3. To start, consider 
‘beautiful’. With Hepworth sculptures as stimuli, ‘beautiful’ functioned 
differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 0.009, Cramer’s V = 0.325) 
and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 38.270, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.710). With Moore 
sculptures as stimuli, ‘beautiful’ functioned differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact 
(2-sided), p = 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.380) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 33.740, p < 
0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.654). Then, consider ‘elegant’. With Brancusi sculptures as 
stimuli, ‘elegant’ functioned differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 
0.049, Cramer’s V = 0.237) and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 48.149, p < 0.001, 
Cramer’s V = 0.776). With Noguchi sculptures as stimuli, ‘elegant’ functioned 
differently from ‘long’ (Fisher’s exact (2-sided), p = 0.009, Cramer’s V = 0.317) 
and from ‘spotted’ (X2(1) = 39.336, p < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.715).14 Overall, 
there was a clear replication of the effect observed in Study 3.  
But what about the two alternative hypotheses we discussed earlier? In 
short, we found no clear evidence for either.  
To operationalize the no crisp judgments hypothesis, we examined the 
mean of difference in the comparative phase, with respect to the participants 
who refused in the selection phase. For those participants, the mean differences 
were: Mdiff = 10.50 for ‘beautiful’ / Hepworth, Mdiff = 14.55 for ‘beautiful’ / Moore, 
Mdiff = 12.33 for ‘elegant’ / Brancusi, and Mdiff = 9.63 for ‘elegant’ / Noguchi. 
These are not huge differences, but they are not negligible on a 100-point scale 
either. Although we cannot definitively disprove the no crisp judgments 
hypothesis, owing to the fact that what counts as a relatively small difference is 
vague or highly theory dependent, we think the mean differences observed in 
this study make this hypothesis less plausible. 
                                                      
14 As before, we tested two sets of stimuli with the paradigmatic relative adjective ‘long’. We used the one with 
the smaller difference of length between stimuli in these analyses. 
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To assess the absolute with varying thresholds hypothesis, it will be 
useful to take participants’ responses to ‘spotted’ as a comparison. When 
participants saw a disk that does not meet the minimum threshold for being 
spotted—that is, it has 0 spots—participants tended to say that it is not at all 
spotted (Mmin = 0.07). However, when we looked at the instances in which 
participants complied with aesthetic adjectives, the pattern is different. There, 
the analogous means of the object that participants judged to be less beautiful or 
elegant indicated that participants still think of them as above their own 
minimum threshold. The lower means were: Mmin = 31.27 for ‘beautiful’ / 
Hepworth, Mmin = 21.08 for ‘beautiful’ / Moore, Mmin = 27.94 for ‘elegant’ / 
Brancusi, and Mmin = 29.15 for ‘elegant’ / Noguchi. (Remember the scales go 
from not at all (beautiful/elegant) to extremely (beautiful/elegant). So, 
essentially, participants are asked to align their own minimum threshold to 0.15) 
These results suggest that aesthetic adjectives do not function as absolute 
adjectives with varying thresholds. 
 
6. Classifying Gradable Adjectives, Redux 
 
6.1. Dilemma for the Relative/Absolute Classification Scheme 
 
Let us return to the relative/absolute classification scheme of gradable adjectives, 
which says that there are two distinct categories of gradable adjectives: relative 
ones such as ‘tall’ and ‘fat’, which have context-sensitive standards, and absolute 
ones such as ‘straight’ and ‘full’, which do not have context-sensitive standards. 
As things stand, the relative/absolute classification scheme of gradable adjectives 
receives support from both Syrett and colleagues’ experimental results and 
somewhat equivocal data from other semantic disagnostics (Kennedy 2007; 
Toledo and Sassoon 2011; Liao, McNally, and Meskin forthcoming). We will 
argue that our experimental results raise a dilemma for proponents of this 
classification scheme. 
The first horn of the dilemma: If those proponents accept our 
experimental methodology, then the strange behaviours of aesthetic adjectives 
that we have observed in Studies 1-4 suggest that the relative/absolute 
classification scheme has to be significantly refined, at the very least. Our studies 
consistently showed that aesthetic adjectives of various kinds—positive and 
negative, thin and thick—do not function like either paradigmatic relative 
adjectives or paradigmatic absolute adjectives. Perhaps the categories of relative 
and absolute are not exhaustive, and one or more additional categories are 
needed. Or perhaps the categories of relative and absolute adjectives do not 
correspond to robust kinds. Or, perhaps, as Liao, McNally, and Meskin 
(forthcoming) suggest, there may be distinct aspects on which aesthetic 
adjectives are similar to relative and to absolute adjectives; that is, the 
                                                      
15 However, as an anonymous referee points out, it is an empirically open question whether participants in fact 
align their thresholds to 0 on the scale provided. Specifically, the referee notes that the threshold implicitly used 
in a selective judgment might differ from the threshold used in explicitly responding to a scale, in the 
comparative phase of Study 4. We think this is a reasonable worry and thank the referee for raising it.  
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relative/absolute classification scheme in fact captures multiple aspects of 
gradable adjectives’ typology, which have not yet been properly delineated.16 
The second horn of the dilemma: If those proponents of the gradable 
adjective reject our experimental methodology, then they lose a key piece of 
evidence in favour of the relative/absolute classification scheme. The significance 
of our experimental results would be downgraded if one can argue that 
experimental methods are less suitable than non-experimental semantic 
diagnostics to uncover semantic properties. However, making this line of 
argument would also force proponents of the relative/absolute classification 
scheme to similarly downplay Syrett and colleagues’ experimental results. They 
would then be left with only somewhat equivocal data from other semantic 
diagnostics. 
 
6.2. Routes for Escaping the Dilemma 
 
We now consider two ways that a proponent of the relative/absolute 
classification scheme might attempt to make sense of our data. Both, like the two 
hypotheses considered in Section 5, rest on the idea that there are probably more 
interpersonal variations in the application of aesthetic adjectives than in the 
application of descriptive adjectives such as ‘tall’ and ‘spotted’. 
 An examination of the philosophical tradition suggests that aesthetic 
adjectives such as ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ may exhibit a great deal of polysemy. 
Kant (1790/1987), for example, distinguishes between ‘free’ or ‘pure’ beauty on 
the one hand and ‘dependent’ or ‘adherent’ beauty on the other. Sibley (2001c) 
distinguishes between narrow senses of ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ (in which they refer 
to one among many positive or negative aesthetic qualities) and wide senses of 
those terms (in which they are used to refer generically to anything with positive 
or negative aesthetic value respectively). Levinson (2011) has recently argued 
that there is an ‘irreducible variety of visual beauty’. One natural way of making 
sense of some of these proposals is to assume that ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ are each 
associated with multiple related scales (cf. Glanzberg 2007).  
 On the first route for escaping the dilemma, aesthetic adjectives like 
‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ are polysemous between relative and absolute readings. 
(Compare Kennedy (2011) on ‘old’.)17 If a significant number of our participants 
use ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ as relative adjectives but others use them as absolute 
adjectives, then we would expect the intermediate levels of compliance that we 
found with these aesthetic adjectives. Some would comply because they were 
treating the terms as relative adjectives, but some would refuse to comply since 
they were treating the terms as absolute adjectives. 
On the second route for escaping the dilemma, the intermediate levels of 
compliance is due to the fact that some participants simply cannot determine the 
appropriate scale to apply with a given set of stimuli (while other participants 
                                                      
16 One anonymous referee suggests that aesthetic adjectives might have especially strong default comparison 
classes that make them less context-sensitive than typical relative adjectives. On this suggestion, aesthetic 
adjectives are distinct from paradigmatic relative and absolute adjectives, but the distinction is not sharp. 
Indeed, we explore a variation of this suggestion in Liao, McNally, and Meskin (forthcoming). However, we 
note that this suggestion by itself would not be sufficient to explain the pattern of mixed usage we found in the 
set of studies reported in the present paper. We thank the referee for the suggestion. 
17 Perhaps the earlier discussion of apparently conflicting intuitions about ‘pretty’ in footnote 4 offers some 
limited support for this version of the polysemy hypothesis. 
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can).18 One might consider hypothetical cases in which other adjectives plausibly 
associated with a wide range of scales, such as ‘talented’ or ‘smart’, were tested. 
Confronted with two individuals and asked to pick the talented one, it may be 
difficult to determine the relevant scale of talent to employ. This version of the 
polysemy reply, which appeals to the multidimensional nature of evaluative 
aesthetic adjectives, may also have greater potential to explain our finding of a 
relative prevalence of neither-greater responses with aesthetic adjectives. 
Indeterminacy with regard to the relevant scale might have generated participant 
resistance to judging one object as more ugly than the other. 
We believe that these polysemy replies, especially the latter one, are live 
possibilities. However, they both face the challenge of explaining the results with 
‘elegant’ from Study 3 and Study 4. Although ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ are commonly 
claimed to admit of multiple related scales, we know of no extant discussion of 
‘elegant’ as similarly polysemous, and to the same degree. Given that ‘elegant’ 
can plausibly be expected to be less multidimensional than ‘beautiful’ because it 
contains a descriptive component, one should expect to find a different pattern 
of response with ‘elegant’ than with ‘beautiful’. However, the experimental 
results do not conform to this expectation. 
 
7. Further Implications and Avenues for Future Research 
 
Our research represents the convergence of several independent lines of inquiry 
in linguistics, philosophy of language, philosophical aesthetics, and experimental 
philosophy. Although we have focused on the linguistics upshots thus far, our 
research also advances the state of debate elsewhere. In this section we briefly 
describe the other lines of inquiry and point to what our research adds to each. 
 
7.1. Relation to Predicates of Personal Taste 
 
Linguists and philosophers of language have, in recent years, taken a great deal of 
interest in a nearby class of adjectives (e.g., ‘tasty’ and ‘fun’), which are often 
called predicates of personal taste. But these researchers have had much less to 
say about aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’.19 For some, the 
avoidance is by design. Lasersohn (2005) explicitly sets aside ‘beautiful’ to avoid 
fundamental issues in aesthetics (645). Similarly, Sundell (2011) avoids aesthetic 
terms so as to “set aside for the moment as much philosophical baggage as 
possible” (268). For others, the absence is due to convenience. As Stephenson 
(2007) acknowledges, “Ultimately it would be desirable to give all of these classes 
[including taste predicates and aesthetic adjectives] a unified treatment, but (like 
Lasersohn) I will restrict my attention to the paradigm cases of tasty and fun” 
(490). Our experimental paradigm can be extended to test the semantic 
properties of this class of adjectives. In turn, our results can play a part in either 
aiding the construction of the elusive unified treatment of aesthetic adjectives 
                                                      
18 We thank Tim Sundell for this suggestion. 
19 For some notable exceptions see Egan (2010) and Baker (2012). 
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and predicates of personal taste, or suggesting a principled distinction between 
the two.20  
Moreover, our results can point to similarities between aesthetic 
adjectives and other segments of natural language. For example, Hansen and 
Chemla (manuscript) extended the PAT to color terms and found that they also 
exhibited intermediate patterns of behavior, similar to ones we found with 
aesthetic adjectives. Their and our results thus collectively suggest a previously-
unexplored similarity between aesthetic adjectives and color terms. 
 
7.2. Relation to Experimental Philosophy 
 
In recent years, the limitations of standard philosophical tools have become 
apparent, with many debates reaching stalemates that cannot be resolved by, say, 
appeals to intuition and introspection. In other philosophical domains, 
experimental philosophers have done much to generate new debates or move 
existing ones forward. The same cannot be said for aesthetics.21 Of the published 
works of experimental philosophical aesthetics, two—Kamber (2011) and Cova 
and Pain (2012)—aim to trace the contours of folk aesthetics. In contrast, two 
others—Meskin et al. (2013) and Liao, Strohminger, and Sripada (2014)—aim to 
uncover the psychological processes that underlie aesthetic judgments and 
engagements. Our research constitutes a distinctive venture into aesthetic 
psychology in its aim to uncover the connection between making and 
communicating aesthetic judgments. It thus represents another significant step 
toward understanding the non-perceptual aspects of philosophical aesthetics 
through experimental methods. 
 
7.3. Relation to Aesthetic Communication 
 
Philosophical aestheticians have a longstanding interest in the nature and use of 
aesthetic adjectives—consider, for example, the traditional project of defining 
key aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful’, ‘sublime’, and ‘ugly’. In the 
contemporary context, Frank Sibley’s influential argument to the effect that the 
application of aesthetic terms are never solely determined by their non-aesthetic 
conditions has instigated a significant research programme devoted to exploring 
those terms and their use in ordinary and critical discourse (Sibley 1959; Kivy 
1973). To take another example, Kendall Walton’s seminal work on the role 
played by categories in aesthetic judgments raised the question of whether 
gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’ or ‘small’ might serve as models for 
understanding aesthetic adjectives (Walton 1970). But despite the interest in 
aesthetic language in general and aesthetic adjectives in particular, philosophical 
aestheticians have been notably resistant to engaging with the current theories of 
the semantics of adjectives that are found in linguistics and philosophy of 
language. Perhaps this is partly due to the tendency of those fields to avoid 
addressing distinctively aesthetic adjectives. If so, our results should provide 
                                                      
20 McNally and Stojanovic (forthcoming) argue that aesthetic adjectives are distinct from predicates of personal 
taste on the basis of other semantic diagnostics. 
21 For an overview of the limited extant literature in experimental philosophical aesthetics, see Cova, Garcia, 
and Liao (forthcoming). 
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philosophical aestheticians a reason to begin to engage with semantic theories. 
Naturally, our experimental paradigm can also be extended to test other 
adjectives that are central in aesthetic discourse, such as ‘sublime’. 
Moreover, if our results are right, they have the potential to shed some 
light on aesthetic communication. Many philosophers have suggested that 
various forms of aesthetic communication (for example, the communication of 
aesthetic judgments or of the mental states underlying aesthetic 
characterizations) are impossible or, at least, impossible in the absence of first-
person experience.22 We think that too much of our ordinary communicative 
practice about the arts would be incoherent if aesthetic communication were 
impossible in the absence of the objects of our aesthetic interest. On our view, 
aesthetic communication in the absence of first-hand experience is not 
impossible, it is just hard. And, on our view, there is no one reason that it is 
hard—there are a variety of factors that make such communication more 
difficult than ordinary communication. Our results, which show a significant 
amount of interpersonal variation in how agents use aesthetic adjectives, provide 
one piece of the puzzle in explaining the difficulty with aesthetic 
communication.  
  
                                                      
22 For example, Richard Wollheim’s acquaintance principle, which states that aesthetic judgments “must be 
based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible 
from one person to another” implies scepticism about communication involving aesthetic judgments 
(Wollheim 1980: 233). For another example, Philip Pettit holds that “the putatively cognitive state one is in 
when, perceiving a work of art, one sincerely assents to a given aesthetic characterization, is not a state to which 
one can have non-perceptual access” (Pettit 1987: 25). If Pettit is right, then the communication of the 
cognitive states underlying aesthetic characterizations is impossible without the recipient having perceptual 
access to the work. 
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